We investigate determinants of investment decisions in investment-based (equity and real estate) crowdfunding campaigns, using a novel investment-, investor-and campaign-level database. We find that this market is a man's world, with nearly 93% of investments made by men. We find that women invest less in the riskiest investments but more in safer ones. These findings are better explained by differences in risk aversion than differences in overconfidence between men and women. Investors located in an area considered more "sociable" (socially friendly) also invest more, but only if the investor is a woman. Overall, the findings contribute to our understanding of how investment-based crowdfunding can be a viable source of entrepreneurial finance and how entrepreneurs' campaign decisions affect investor participation.
Introduction
Investors' behavior has been extensively studied in finance. The areas of investigation include personal finance, retirement savings, CEO investment choices and venture capital finance. In contrast, scholars know little about the decision making process of non-expert individuals in startup finance (Ahlers et al., 2015; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2016; Vismara, 2016) . This paper attempts to fill this gap, providing a detailed examination of investment-based crowdfunding choices, which involve small, non-accredited investors.
More precisely, we study the influence of gender and local environment on investment choices made on these platforms.
While reward-and donation-based crowdfunding has quickly become popular due to Indiegogo in 2008 and Kickstarter in 2009 (Agrawal et al., 2013; Cumming et al., 2014; Mollick, 2014) , equity crowdfunding has been slow to develop, notably because of regulatory constraints in most countries around the world in selling financial securities to the general public (Ahlers, et al., 2015; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2016) . More recently, another form of crowdfunding, which enables the crowd to co-fund real estate projects, has emerged. Equity and real estate crowdfunding are intended to help entrepreneurs fund their real estate projects or company. Crowdfunding has become a viable alternative to traditional sources of entrepreneurial finance and a way to "democratize" finance by providing investment opportunities to innovative start-ups that, so far, have been restricted to institutional and accredited investors (Agrawal et al., 2015; Kim and Hann, 2015; Mollick, 2014) .
Equity and real estate crowdfunding are fundamentally different from other forms of crowdfunding, in that the crowd makes investment decisions and not consumption-or donation-related ones. Therefore, current understanding of crowdfunding based on studies of these other forms of crowdfunding has limited applicability for investment-based crowdfunding, because incentives and compensation of the crowd are different. The issues studied in the context of reward-based crowdfunding (Agrawal et al., 2015; Kim and Hann, 2015; Mollick, 2014) have investigated so far, including the effect of gender, geographical distance, social capital of entrepreneurs, and the local environment in which investors live, must be analyzed separately for investment-based crowdfunding. In addition, equity and real estate crowdfunding inevitably affect the types of individuals who participate in these campaigns. Our data show that 93% of equity crowdfunders are men and that the bulk of investors are between 35 and 55 years of age. This dominance of men in investment-based crowdfunding is in line with previous literature on investment. Decision making in finance is mainly a masculine prerogative, as evidenced in the literature. In the area of corporate investments, Huang and Kisgen (2013) report that 94% of CEOs are men; Graham et al. (2013) conclude the same using statistics for U.S. and non-U.S. CEOs and CFOs. Adopting the viewpoint of fund providers leads to a similar conclusion. Harrison and Mason (2007) indicate that the proportion of women business angels varies between 0% and 10%. BeckerBlease and Sohl (2011) provide similar statistics. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to document this fact for equity and real estate crowdfunding and to investigate how gender difference and conditions of living environment affect investment decisions and campaign outcomes in investment-based crowdfunding. We also examine factors that may explain gender differences by exploiting both sets of crowdfunding types, equity and real estate, which differ in risk.
We build on several finance theories to help explain investments made in equity and real estate crowdfunding. Echoing Ahlers et al. (2015) , we investigate the supply side of investment-based crowdfunding. As these authors note, understanding of "the other side of the equation," or the decision-making process of individual investors that takes place in investment-based crowdfunding, is limited, though crucial for entrepreneurs relying on crowdfunding. Here, we directly examine individual crowdfunders' investment decisions, not only each investment separately but also these individuals' follow-up investments. To develop precise hypotheses and, thus, organize our analysis, we rely on behavioral finance and modern finance theories that help explain the motivations of individuals to make investments and the possible biases to which they may be subject. In particular, we derive predictions on how gender differences and the local environment in which investors live may affect investment decisions. We also explore whether differences in overconfidence and risk aversion between individuals can affect investment decisions.
We use a unique and fully new database to test our hypotheses. We obtain all investments made on the French platform WiSEED in equity and real estate crowdfunding campaigns since its start in 2009. To the best of our knowledge, this database provides more information than what other studies have used so far. Our database contains 10,142 individual investment decisions, among which 73.1% are equity crowdfunding investment decisions. The database contains information on individual investors, including their date of birth, gender, and location of domicile. We are able to track all the investments made by every individual, so we know when someone has invested, how much in which campaign, when, and in which other campaign(s) he or she has participated. From the location of investors, we are further able to combine our investment database with other databases to assess local conditions that are helpful for testing our hypotheses. In addition to investor-level information, our database contains various information on campaign structure, start-ups, and real estate projects.
We obtain the following results. First, with regard to investor characteristics, we find that the investment-based crowdfunding market is a man's world, with nearly 93% of the investments made by men. Thus, this market is not that different from other financial markets. Men are also younger than women on average (42 years vs. 47 years). Second, we document several other gender differences. We find that women invest less in riskier investments, not only in numbers but also in amounts per campaign. Part of this is due to the higher minimum ticket of real estate crowdfunding campaigns, and women make larger investments than men in less risky projects (e.g., real estate). Further analyses show that these findings are better explained by differences in risk aversion between men and women and not differences in overconfidence. Investors located in more sociable (socially friendly) areas also tend to invest more, but only if the investor is a woman. Overall, our findings help explain how investmentbased crowdfunding can be a viable source of entrepreneurial finance and how entrepreneurs can attract investors.
Our study offers several contributions. First, we are able to better assess crowdfunder characteristics. While a few recent studies have examined gender effects (Mohammadi and Shafi, 2015; Marom et al., 2016) , we extend the analysis to local environment factors due to the richness of our database. We find that local factors are also important to understand investment decisions and that these factors interact with gender. Second, we extend the analysis to real estate crowdfunding, a type of investment largely unexplored so far. Our search on SSRN and Google Scholar reveals that no empirical analysis is yet available on real estate crowdfunding. The few available studies are theoretical and merely discuss possible impacts on the real estate market. While our discussion primarily focuses on equity crowdfunding, we include these campaigns in our analysis because they offer a better picture of investments due to differences in risk return between equity crowdfunding and real estate.
The inclusion of both types allows us to examine risk taking by crowdfunders and thereby offer insights into what drives gender differences.
The paper continues as follows. After a brief literature review, we develop our hypotheses.
Then, we discuss the empirical setting and describe the unique data used. Next, we present our empirical results. The final section discusses the results, presents limitations of our study, and concludes.
Literature review and hypotheses development

Literature review
Research identifies several determinants of success of a crowdfunding campaign, including the size of the founder's social network, the presence of a product video, the social capital of founders, the desired funding goal, the duration influence on the probability of success (Frydrych et al., 2014; Giudici et al., 2013; Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2013; Mollick, 2014) .
Geographical location plays less of a role than for other forms of entrepreneurial finance, as crowdfunding alleviates the role of distance in early-stage financing (Agrawal et al., 2015) . Lin et al. (2013) show that social networks can reduce information asymmetries and thereby increase the probability of funding. Social interactions between investors contribute to the success of a campaign. Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2013) examine "herding" behavior among investors and show that projects follow a U-shaped pattern of support in reward-based crowdfunding, with significant activities by crowdfunders occurring the first and last days of a campaign. In the context of equity crowdfunding, Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2015) find that the dynamic pattern becomes U shaped when shares are allocated based on an auction mechanism but L shaped on a first-come, first-served principle. Vismara (2016) find evidence of information cascades in equity crowdfunding, in which early investors help attract followup investors. Although these studies have used data on individual investments, our data enable us to extend the scope of analysis. Indeed, we obtain more information on investors as individuals than merely observing individual investments made at specific dates and hours during the campaigns.
We now turn to the development of our research hypotheses. In contrast with reward-based crowdfunding, investment-based crowdfunding deals with investment decisions of non-expert individuals. Therefore, we logically rely on two complementary theoretical frameworks: behavioral finance and modern finance theories postulating rational behavior. Our empirical results enable us to at least partially disentangle the two strands of theories.
Hypotheses development
According to modern finance theory, an individual investor facing an investment decision should engage in a rational decision-making process. This process involves many steps, including defining the problem, identifying the criteria, weighting the criteria, generating alternatives, rating each alternative on each criterion, and computing the optimal decision (Bazerman and Moore, 2009 ). Extant literature, however, shows that people do not always decide according to such a rational model (see Kahneman, 2011) . Simon (1957) proposes a way to accommodate this departure from the prescriptive decision analysis: because human rationality is bounded, the best way to understand the decision-making process is to determine how decisions are made. When people must make decisions, especially decisions with uncertain outcomes, they regularly rely on heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) .
Heuristics are simple rules of thumb that help people simplify decision making and avoid cognitive overload induced by complex choices. Heuristics influence investment choices of individuals (Agnew, 2006; Benartzi, 2001 ) but can also lie at the origin of biases (Gilovich and Griffin, 2002; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) . In this paper, we follow this and other approaches and examine the decision process of individual investors in the context of investment-based crowdfunding.
The influence of gender
One possible explanation for different individual behaviors between men and women is risk aversion, which leads the more risk averse individual to make fewer and smaller investments in risky assets. Croson and Gneezy (2009) find that women exhibit higher risk aversion than men whatever the setting, whether experimental or in real conditions of investment. In the field of investment, several studies show that women invest less in risky assets than men (Agnew et al., 2003; Sunden and Surette, 1998) . Under risk aversion, this results from the fact that differences in risk preferences cause women to dislike risk more than men (for a related discussion, see Markowitz, 1959) ; as a result, they also undertake fewer investments.
This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a (gender and investment): Female crowdfunders make fewer and smaller investments than male crowdfunders.
Hypothesis 1b (gender and risk):
Male crowdfunders invest more in riskier projects than female crowdfunders.
2.2.2 Are women more risk-averse or less overconfident than men?
An alternative explanation for the same effects as derived in Hypotheses 1a and 1b is differences in overconfidence between men and women. From a review of economic literature, Croson and Gneezy (2009) conclude that women are not only more risk averse than men, but they also indicate that men are more overconfident in their success in uncertain situations and that overconfidence could explain the observed differences in risk attitudes between women and men. In the field of finance, Barber and Odean (2001) and Agnew et al. (2003) find that men trade more than women. In the same vein, Estes and Hosseini (1988) conclude that women have less confidence than men in their investment decisions. Therefore, gender influences people's level of confidence, which implies, for example, that men would overestimate the probability of success of a nascent firm and women would make fewer significant investment decisions (Huang and Kisgen, 2013) . Women participate more in retirement plans and invest less in company stocks, which in their setting means that they make better decision (Agnew, 2006) . Becker-Blease and Sohl (2011) find similar results for business angels and, in particular, validate the hypothesis that the participation of women in venture capital investment decisions leads to fewer investments; in other words, women invest less than men. The authors advocate that overconfidence can explain this phenomenon.
In the same vein, Harrison and Mason (2007) observe that women business angels are less active than men (on average 3.3 investments during the period January 2001 to mid-2004 for men vs. 2.6 for women). Huang and Kisgen (2013) confirm these results for CEOs of U.S. firms, finding that female executives are less likely to make acquisitions than male executives.
In the area of finance, many studies find that overconfidence leads to suboptimal decisions. Statman et al. (2006) and Glaser and Weber (2007) show that overconfidence causes excessive trading volume. Mitchell and Utkus (2006) , Benartzi (2001) conclude the same in the area of retirement savings, finding that people make poor investment decisions when they are overconfident. CEOs can also be overconfident and thus overinvest (when they have excess cash available) or undertake too many mergers Tate, 2005, 2008) . Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001) show that investment decisions of overconfident venture capitalists are biased, leading them to finance inappropriate ventures. In summary, overconfidence often affects people in their financial decisions, which are naturally complex, regardless of whether they are experts or not.
To disentangle these two explanations, we rely on research in the field of social psychology. Dunning et al. (1990) and Vallone et al. (1990) conduct experiments that show that people are overconfident in predicting the behavior of their peers. In a crowdfunding investment decision, people must choose projects that will be the most appreciated by their peers on the crowdfunding platform; otherwise, projects may not get funded in the first place. Rather, a project will be funded only if enough people finance it, and they will do so only if they believe that other people will consider it a valuable project. That is, individuals must guess others' behavior. In the context of crowdfunding, a failed campaign is one that does not raise the desired amount of funds. In this case, overconfident investors will more likely finance unsuccessful projects because their overconfidence in predicting peers' behavior leads them to select less desirable projects. Failing to find support for this prediction would lead us to consider that the excessive investing behavior of men is due to risk preferences (i.e., our alternative hypothesis). Thus:
Hypothesis 2 (gender and outcome): Men finance projects that fail to achieve their funding goals more often than women.
The impact of local environment
In the context of retirement savings, Duflo and Saez (2002, p. 122) indicate that "the literature on informational cascades […] provides reasons why information (correct or not) obtained from co-workers may be an important factor in deciding whether to participate and how to invest -giving rise to peer effects." Thus, it is reasonable to assume the same is true for crowdfunding investing. Word-of-mouth communication contributes to explain investors' behaviors in financial areas, including crowdfunding. Extant literature shows that social interactions lead to investment and trading decisions (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Hong et al., 2004 Hong et al., , 2005 Ivković and Weisbenner, 2007; Kaustia and Knüpfer, 2012; Ng and Wu, 2010) . These studies suggest that stronger social influences result in higher participation rates in the stock markets. Hong et al. (2005) and Ivković and Weisbenner (2007) also show that investors in the same city are likely to buy similar securities. Therefore, investor's local environment does matter and affect the investment decision process.
An important determinant of this communicational effect lies in sociability. If people do not interact regularly or easily, social influence cannot result. Ivković and Weisbenner (2007) find that the correlation between an individual investor's stock purchases and that of his or her neighbors increases with the sociability in the area of living. This result is of particular interest here because crowdfunding is a purchasing decision made by individuals.
Furthermore, social households, those that socially interact often with their neighbors, are more susceptible to invest in the stock market (Hong et al., 2004) . Thus, individuals with more social interactions likely invest more in risky assets, because stock market participation is risky. Ng and Wu (2010) observe the same phenomenon for investments in risky assets.
Peer effects resulting from social interactions (i.e., the influence of word-of-mouth effects) are more prevalent in buys than in sales. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3a (sociability): The more a crowdfunder's area of living is socially friendly, the larger is the amount he or she invests.
Local factors may also interact with gender. Venkatesh and Morris (2000) find that gender is a critical determinant of so-called technology acceptance. Women tend to conform more to consensus than men and respond differently to social stimuli. They put more emphasis on social cues than men. In general, Carli (1989) argues that women are more easily influenced than men. In the context of microcredit, D'espallier et al. (2011) stress that women are more prone to peer pressures in credit groups. Venkatesh and Morris (2000) suggest that women give more weight to opinions of other people in their decision-making process. In a social area of living, social interactions are stronger and people are more connected with each other.
In such an environment, women should be more influenced by the opinion of others than in areas with poor social interactions. Thus:
Hypothesis 3b (sociability and gender):
The effect of sociability of the local environment is stronger for women than men.
In testing these hypotheses, we control for different factors that may affect our proxies. We offer other possible explanations for differences in investment behavior. One is age of the investor. Older investors may invest in less risky assets because they are closer to retirement than younger investors. Similarly, we control for local factors other than sociability that could affect investor choice. Whenever possible, we include proxies for population and the wealth and education of the local population. In particular, wealth and education are likely to affect the capacity of individuals to make investments. Because we are unable to obtain information on these factors at the individual level, we rely on proxies measured at the local population level to control for these factors. Moreover, we consider distance between investor and the startup (for equity crowdfunding) as possible geographical factor affecting investment (consistent with Agrawal et al., 2015) . Finally, we include several project-specific characteristics (and several fixed effects) that are likely to affect the level of investment; we introduce these subsequently.
Empirical setting and data
Empirical setting: WiSEED
Our unique data set is provided by WiSEED, a France-based equity crowdfunding platform.
The French crowdfunding market emerged in 2008 with MyMajorCompany, a donationbased platform intended to finance largely unknown artists. In 2008, two platforms were online; by September 2015, 70 were registered (all types of crowdfunding confounded:
reward-based, donation-based, peer-to-peer lending, and equity-based), 16 of which were equity-based crowdfunding platforms. While the market has become highly competitive, it is also concentrated around two main platforms (WiSEED and Anaxago), which represent more than 80% of the French equity crowdfunding market.
1
The WiSEED platform was launched by two co-founders in 2009 as the first French equity crowdfunding platform, with headquarters based in Toulouse, France. The aim of the platform was to help finance young companies through crowdfunding to reduce the so-called equity gap (Cosh, Cumming, and Hughes, 2009 ).
According to the French regulator, the AMF (Autorité des Marchés Financiers), soliciting equity from the crowd without a prospectus was forbidden until October 2014, unless it complied with given exemptions (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2015) . The main exemption limited the total offer to less than EUR 100,000 for a given year. Moreover, if investors were pooled in a dedicated holding that syndicates investors, a limit of 149 people was imposed.
These conditions constrained the development of a broader equity crowdfunding market in governed by French law. As we mentioned previously, there is no limit in the number of investors who can join the holding company as shareholders.
WiSEED's core responsibilities are to select start-ups seeking funding, undertake due diligence, help them collect money, and follow them until a medium-term exit horizon. The WiSEED team consists of 30 members located in both the Toulouse and Paris offices.
WiSEED receives more than 1,200 projects every year. Every week, an internal selection committee meets to select start-ups that are within the investment scope of WiSEED. This scope is defined as follows: Young innovative ventures, with a dedicated team, with a proof of concept done, with a go-to-market identified.
2 WiSEED focuses mainly on start-ups active in the sectors of biotechnology or clean tech. Moreover, these start-ups should have a social, a societal, or an environmental impact.
The selected ventures are then presented on the website (168 in the first half of 2015). Each firm has its own online profile with a video, a resume of its activity, some financial data, and a corporate presentation. WiSEED relies on its members to select the final projects. In this final selection, called the "e-vote" phase, members are asked to vote according to 11 objective criteria (product & services, team, regulation, market, competition, intellectual property, business model, clients, social responsibility, financial coherence, and commercial action), give their investment intention, and possibly leave a comment on the public forum.
After four weeks, WiSEED allows the project to officially launch its campaign if it has collected more than 100 voters and more than EUR 100,000 of investment intentions, including a minimum of 25% expressed by current investors. However, before the official launch, the platform undertakes a final, extended due diligence on these companies. The venture valuation is negotiated only at this time. This due diligence occurs offline, by
WiSEED analysts who check items such as financial consistency and intellectual and industrial property. Only then can the company launch the campaign.
Firms that meet these criteria are eligible to start their fundraising campaign, which lasts between one and three months. The actual length of the campaign depends on the financial needs of the firm and the "buzz" around the campaign. The investment documentation goes only to members of WiSEED who completed their registration, which requires them to send a scan of their ID card, a formal proof of residence, and a completed "Know Your Customer" form, which ensures that WiSEED collects information on its members. Before the campaign is launched, a minimum threshold, a "desired" funding goal, and a maximum limit are defined with the entrepreneur. The goal is what the entrepreneur would like to raise, and the minimum is the threshold above which the platform considers the fundraising campaign valid.
With regard to the funding goal, WiSEED applies a hybrid funding model, which mixes a "keep-it-all" funding model and an "all-or-nothing" model (for a discussion on differences and implications for entrepreneurs, see Cumming et al., 2014) . In other words, the funds raised would be paid out to the firm, even if the funding goal is not reached. However, if funds raised are below the minimum threshold, all the money is returned to the investors.
Moreover, while equity offers have existed since 2009 on the platform, WiSEED has offered investments in real estate projects since 2011. Individuals can therefore choose between more risky investments in start-ups through equity and in less risky real estate projects in the form of bonds (typically offering a 10% annual interest during a 12-36-months period). Although real estate crowdfunding resembles lending-based crowdfunding because of the use of interest-generating bonds, the two processes are quite different. Here, the bonds issued to investors are used to finance the equity part that the entrepreneur has to provide in order to obtain the bank mortgage for funding the major part of his real estate project. Thus, these bonds have lower priority than the bank mortgage (but higher than the entrepreneur's equity)
in case of project failure, giving it a quasi-equity property. Still, from the perspective of investors on WiSEED, an investment in these bonds remains safer than one in equity crowdfunding. First, real estate projects have a significant amount of collateral, since the bulk of the funds is invested in fixed, long-term assets (i.e., property). And second, while these bonds have lower priority than bank mortgage in case of bankruptcy, their maturity (maximum of 36 months) tend to be shorter than the bank mortgage. Thus, bonds tend to be repaid earlier, thereby reducing risk. 
Data and summary statistics
Analysis and results
In this section, we test our hypotheses to determine what drives investment decisions and the extent to which gender and local factors, as well as the interaction between them, help explain these decisions. In doing so, we provide insights into the theoretical framework that can explain such behavior and, in particular, whether behavioral aspects are at play. Table 2 ). In all other specifications, sector dummies are included so that the variable Investment Type (1=Equity) is dropped due to almost perfect collinearity. Indeed, as reported in Table 2 , Panel B, there is only a single real estate company doing an equity crowdfunding campaign. Regression (3) uses the subsample of male crowdfunders and Regression (4) uses the subsample of female crowdfunders. Regression (5) is restricted to equity crowdfunding and Regression (6) to real estate investments. When we control for other factors, men invest, on average, larger amounts than women. In economic terms, the difference between men and women represents EUR 162.1 (= 0.188 centered on the log-mean of 6.758), based on the most conservative result (Regression (1)). However, we obtain opposite results for equity and real estate. Men invest more than women in equity but less than women in real estate. This difference is consistent with the idea that men invest more when the asset is risky (equity) and less in safer assets (real estate) than women. These findings offer empirical support for both Hypotheses 1a and 1b. As mentioned previously, two explanations are possible: overconfidence and risk aversion. Later below, we perform a test to distinguish between the two possible explanations.
[ TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Several control variables are significant, some of which also provide further insights into differences in investment decisions between men and women. For the full sample (Regressions (1) and (2)), we find that investors located in France invest less than investors located elsewhere, with a difference of EUR 264.4 around the log-mean (based on Regression (1)). In addition, informing investors about the investment status of the campaign (the variable Inv. Status Available) is associated with larger investments. Until October 17, 2014, individuals visiting a campaign website could see how much had been raised so far, while the campaign was ongoing. After that date, this information was no longer provided, so individuals do not know any longer the current status of the campaign in terms of amounts raised so far. A possible reason is that this removal increases the uncertainty around the success of the campaign so that investors, conditional on making an investment, invest less because of increased risk. When considering men and women separately (Regressions (3) and (4)), we find that the difference between men and women is strongest in the first days of the campaign, when the outcome is most uncertain. While men tend to invest more during these first days (significant coefficient of 0.147), women tend to invest much less (significant coefficient of -0.935). Overall, these findings suggest that men either take more risk or are overconfident.
Analyses in Table 5 help further test whether men are more likely to reinvest (Hypothesis 1a).
We run Probit regressions using a dummy variable that indicates whether a given investor made a follow-up investment. We run this analysis on the full sample, as well as on subsamples that exclude investors who made their first investment late. The regressions on subsamples are helpful in reducing sample biases with regard to investors who only recently began investing in equity and real estate crowdfunding on the given platform. In all our regressions, we find a strong and statistically significant impact of gender. Men have a 48%-58% greater probability of making a follow-up investment than women. This finding provides empirical support for Hypothesis 1a.
[ Table 3 shows that, ceteris paribus, men invest more than women and in riskier projects, consistent with Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Under Hypothesis 2, the driving force is overconfidence, which leads men to invest in less successful campaigns. A lack of support for Hypothesis 2 would suggest that differences in risk aversion is a more plausible explanation for this gender difference. In Table 6 , we perform the tests along three related measures of successful campaign outcome. Ahlers et al. (2015) propose several measures of funding success (e.g., attainment of targeted amount, number of investors, funding amount, speed of completion of campaign). We chose to retain a success measure based on funding amount because the size of the minimum ticket directly influences the number of investors and the speed of completion depends on a project's chosen campaign duration, which varies in our sample. The first measure (used in
Regressions (1)- (3)) uses the variable Funded Dummy, which equals 1 if the desired goal was achieved; the second measure (used in Regressions (4)- (6)) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the Achieved Funding Ratio is larger than the 90th percentile (the most successful); finally, the third measure (used in Regressions (9)- (12)) is simply the Achieved Funding Ratio. We obtain consistent results in all the regressions, showing no gender effect in campaign outcome (i.e., men do not invest in campaigns that are less successful). Therefore, we find no empirical support for Hypothesis 2. Instead, we conclude that the difference in risk aversion rather than overconfidence is more likely to explain the gender difference related to Hypotheses 1a and 1b. But, we have to handle these results and this conclusion with care, because our outcomes measures are imperfect proxies of success. To completely rule out the effect of overconfidence, we should use projects' rates of return, which are unfortunately unavailable due to the young age of funded firms.
[ TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Next, in Table 7 we test differences in local factors and their interaction with gender. In line with hypotheses 3a, and 3b, we consider the sociability (only available for investors located in France). To determine gender differences, we run the regressions separately for men and
women. An alternative way would be to include interaction terms between gender and local factors so that everything can be estimated in a single regression; unfortunately, this leads to strong multicollinearity (and, thus, high variance inflation factors [VIFs] ) because 93% of all investors are men. The method used here does not suffer from this problem, as the VIFs of all our explanatory variables are below 5 in Table 7 . All the explanatory variables and fixed effects included in Table 4 are also included in Table 7 . We obtain the following results.
First, as a preliminary investigation of local environment factors, we control for the influence of geographical proximity as an apparent effect of social interactions could result from a tendency of women to invest in closer firms. We find that geographical distance does not affect investments, as shown in Table 7 . We obtain this result using distance in kilometers and for any meaningful binary transformation (here, this distance reflects 100 km, but we checked other values as well).
[ Second, all else equal, investors living in more sociable areas tend to invest significantly more, and the impact is largest for women. For the second measure Sociability2, the effect is significant only for women, though positive for both men and women. The impact is also economically significant, as a one-standard deviation increase of Sociability1 leads to an increase in investments of EUR 127.6 for women and EUR 35.6 for men (compared with an average amount; i.e., around the mean of Amount Invested). Thus, we find some support for both Hypotheses 3a and 3b with regard to sociability.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature by examining investment-based (equity and real estate) crowdfunding from a buy-side perspective and the investor's perspective, based on a new and rich database that includes investment-and investor-level information. Investors choose to invest in accordance with their risk preference. We therefore offer support for the link between gender and risk taking highlighted in Byrnes et al. (1999) meta-analysis. Men exhibit riskier behavior by investing in riskier assets. We take social factors into consideration to draw a richer picture of investment behavior in crowdfunding investments.
Social interactions have a stronger influence on women's choices. Women invest more when they are involved in social interactions. This finding could be explained by uncertainty resolution resulting from women's conversations with other people.
Our research has some limitations that at the same time offer avenues for future research.
Most notably, we found that investment choices in crowdfunding are better explained by differences in risk preference and that outcomes of investment choices (measured by campaign success in relation to the declared funding goal) are not influenced by gender. In other words, men invest more in risky projects, but risky projects do not exhibit worst campaign performance in terms of raised capital. These rough proxies for the success of a campaign contribute to a rationality-based explanation, but they do not provide us with a definite conclusion. To do so, we need to use the performance of investment choices (i.e., the return of each start-up or real estate project) and calculate risk-adjusted returns. We could not investigate these issues herein because of the difficulty of obtaining such data and because these investments are too recent to obtain good return estimates. However, further research could shed light on this issue.
This research can further be extended in several ways. First, a detailed examination of individual crowdfunding dynamics seems to be a promising research avenue. Existing studies largely consider investment decisions in isolation, while finance theory shows there are benefits of taking a portfolio perspective. Our collected sample of investments offers the unique possibility to investigate dynamic strategies of building portfolios since we are able to track investors over time across the different crowdfunding campaigns. Second, our study can be extended by elaborating on several situational and network factors, such as minimum tickets and the number of competing investments. These factors are likely to influence crowdfunders' investments, but they merely served as control variables in our analysis.
Similarly, textual analysis of campaign descriptions may offer new insights into how communications affect investors' choices and mitigate concerns about risk. Third, research could investigate the wisdom of the crowd more directly. The screening process at WiSEED involves an e-vote phase prior to allowing the startup to start its fundraising campaign.
Members of WiSEED assign several grades to different dimensions (e.g., sustainability, customers, business model) of the projects. A detailed examination of the link between the grades of the different attributes and ex post investor behavior during the campaign would convey important information on crucial investor concerns. This could help the platform improve its selection process and ex post matching by reinforcing the screening phase with feedback from current platform members through the e-votes. The age of investor in years at time of investment. This variable is constructed as the difference between the investor's exact investment date and birth date. -9,999, 10,000-49,999, 50,000-199,999, 200,000-1,999,999 , and for Paris separately. The index is calculated for men and women separately. A higher value of this measure corresponds to greater sociability. (source: INSEE; http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/detail.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=ir-edt2010&page=irweb/edt2010/dd/edt2010_loisirs36.htm) Inv. Location: Sociability2
Alternative measure of the level of sociability in the area the investor lives in (based on population size) and based on the investor's gender. The index measures the percentage of the population that engages in any social activity. Values are provided by the data source for the population size ranges [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 999, 10, 999, 50, 999, 200, [0] [1] 999, 999 , and for Paris separately. The index is calculated for men and women separately. A higher value of this measure corresponds to greater sociability. Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the platform WiSEED informs investors about the status of investments made so far, and 0 otherwise. In this case, the information provided is the total amount of investments made so far, which indicates whether the firm is close to achieving its desired funding or has attracted more than that level. This information was provided on the website of each campaign until October 17, 2014, but not after. Table 4 Determinants of Investment Amount
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Amount Invested, which corresponds to the amount pledged by the investor (in euros) in a given campaign. This variable is winsorized for this analysis at the upper 3% level. Regressions (1) and (2) use the full sample, Regression (3) the sample of male investors only, Regressions (4) the sample of female investors only, Regression (5) the sample of investments in equity crowdfunding only, and Regression (6) the sample of investments in real estate only. Robust standard errors are used. Significance levels: *** for 1%, ** for 5%, * for 10%. Table 6 Determinants of Campaign Outcome
Full Sample Equity Only Real Estate Only
The dependent variable in Regressions (1)- (3) is a dummy variable Funded Dummy that equals 1 if the firm achieves the desired funding goal, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Regressions (4)- (6) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the campaign's value of Achieved Funding Ratio (=Raised / Desired) at the end of the campaign is in the top 10% of the distribution (i.e., among the most successful campaigns), and 0 otherwise. Regressions (1)-(6) are Probit regressions, and Regressions (7)- (9) are OLS regressions. The dependent variable in Regressions (7)- (9) is the variable Achieved Funding Ratio at the end of the campaign. Regressions (1), (4), and (7) use the full sample; Regressions (2), (5), and (8) use the sample of equity crowdfunding campaigns only; and Regressions (3), (6), and (9) use the sample of real estate crowdfunding campaigns only. Robust standard errors are used. Significance levels: *** for 1%, ** for 5%, * for 10%. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Amount Invested, which corresponds to the amount pledged by the investor (in euros) in a given campaign. This variable is winsorized for this analysis at the upper 3% level. In Regressions (1)- (4), we use a restricted sample that only includes investors located in Metropolitan France (due to issues related to calculating the variable Distance). In Regressions (5)- (8), we use a restricted sample that includes only investors located in France (thus, we include investors living in French territories outside Europe) due to the availability of information on social factors. Moreover, Regressions (1), (3), (5), and (7) use the sample of male investors only, while Regressions (2), (4), (6) 
